Since the positive conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran is enhancing economic, military, energy and security ties with many countries, particularly with its Caucasus and Central Asian neighbours. Relations with Russia and China -which never stopped -are experiencing a new boom. Access to international financial markets -allowed by the progressive lifting of sanctions -coupled with the expected revenues from oil exports will modernise the Iranian industrial structure and make resources available for new infrastructure projects. This article approaches Iran's geopolitics from a peculiar angle, that is through analysis of the offers Iran made in 2003 and 2005 to the United States and the European Union for solving the nuclear dispute. This article argues, firstly, that these proposals -focused not just on nuclear issues, but also on geopolitical matters -can shed light on how Iran shapes and conveys its geopolitical role in the Middle East and Central Asia; secondly, that such a role has been "legitimised" by global players like the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union (i.e., the 5 + 1 countries which participated at the last round of the nuclear deal) through the positive conclusion of the deal; and, finally, that Iran's geopolitical role within the greater Eurasian space will increasingly assume more important dimensions.
Introduction
The term "Iran nuclear deal" refers to a process of negotiation which lasted from 2002 to 2015 and involved a variable number of countries in addition to the main contenders, Iran and the United States. The target of the protracted negotiations was the Iranian nuclear infrastructure already existing or planned during that period of time.
1 Because of such existing and potential capabilities, Iran suffered repeated economic sanctions 2 and diplomatic isolation. This article uses that negotiation process as a prism to interpret the potential geopolitical role of Iran. It argues that what was at stake through the whole process was not just nuclear deterrence, but the geopolitical role of Iran. As former Italian Ambassador to Teheran Roberto Toscano wrote in December 2014 "what is at stake today goes much beyond the nuclear issue -an issue, incidentally, that has always been instrumentalised for both sides. We are talking about the regional role of Iran, the balance in the Gulf, the future of Iraq, the possibility of checking the onslaught of Sunni jihadists." 3 In other words, as Parsi states in his various works, 4 the US-Iran conflict has been a strategic and not an ideological one, as it has indeed been opportunistically framed by both of the players. 5 During the whole negotiation process, the US administrations' objective has been that of preventing Iran from getting an internationally recognised regional role and in order to pursue such a target it has refused any bargain with Iran.
The instrumentalisation of the "Iran nuclear impasse" 6 by the Bush Administration implies that misunderstanding and misperceptions could have played a role in the long confrontation between the United States and Iran. 7 However, they were neither the only nor the main reason for the failure of the protracted negotiations. Stalemates appear indeed to have been a precise goal for allowing the United States and the international community to use coercion against Iran. At the same time, political narratives -which labelled Iran as "rogue country" 8 and part of the so-called "axis of evil" 9 -as well as diplomatic ones -which imposed the responsibility for the negotiations' stalemate onto Iran -were opportunistically constructed for enhancing Iran's international isolation. Such narratives about Iran -portrayed as a regime which repudiates diplomacy -and the nuclear dealdefined as the most intractable conflict for the United States -did not rise spontaneously, but were fuelled by intentional behaviour as a precise instrument of foreign policy. Faizullaev and Cornut 10 call this kind of opportunistic behaviour as the "narrative management by politicians and diplomats." 11 They state that a " [n] arrative is instrumental for presenting a state's case, achieving political goals, building coalitions and developing and maintaining relationships. Most importantly, narratives are used as instruments of political reasoning and persuasion." 12 In short, Iran's ostracism was intentionally pursued by the Bush Administration through the denial of negotiations and the construction of narratives with the final aim of internationally isolating and weakening the Islamic Republic. In fact, because of the complex regime of sanctions, Iran's participation in multilateral initiatives -in particular those regarding regional issues (for example, peace talks for the Syrian conflict and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's full membership) -have been forbidden.
This article adopts a geopolitical perspective which sees the processes unfolding in the greater Eurasian space as a geographical and resources-driven one. Moreover, states are considered as the main actors at play. This article doesn't support the interpretation of Iran's stance in global affairsin particular those regarding the wider Eurasian area -as ideologically driven. Religion is only one of the Iran's many foreign policy drivers and it is not considered as the most important one. Geopolitical factors -proximity to the European continent on one side and to the Indian subcon- Iran's geopolitical capacity before and after the deal
Since the JCPOA's full implementation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has enhanced its engagement in security and economic projects with all its neighbours. However, Iran had been involved with them well before the nuclear deal's conclusion. In fact, it acted as a mediator in the NagornoKarabakh conflict from the onset of the crisis in 1992. 29 Iran played the mediator role also in the is now considering the possibility of admitting Iran and some other countries. Although the SCO is not very active yet, it has made one more step towards becoming the core of an emerging Greater Eurasia or even a community of Greater Eurasia. Cooperation between China and Russia may play a central role in it. In contrast to the model promoted by the United States, there will be no hegemon in the Eurasian community. China will be the economic leader, but other powerful players -Russia, India, and Iran -will be able to counterbalance Chinese influence." Available at: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/How-the-World-Looks-From-the-RussianPerspective-18303. Accessed 27 September 2016.
42 John Brennen, director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, said that "[t]he money, the revenue that's flowing into Iran is being used to support its currency, to provide moneys to the departments and agencies, build up its infrastructure," as reported in Jay Solomon and Carol E. As far as Iranian-Russian relations are concerned, after the nuclear deal they appear to be in continuous evolution. 56 During the last months of the negotiations, Russia actively engaged in positively concluding them. 57 In From "pariah" state to "player" status in the greater Eurasian space
The Iran nuclear deal shows the entanglement between the diplomatic and political levels in the United States' foreign policy-making process. The negotiations' long impasse can be defined as a strategy which succeeded in obtaining the international ostracism of Iran. Such a process of ostracising is similar to that of "stigmatisation" one, originally theorised by Zarakol 63 and further by Adler-Nissen 64 through applying Goffman's stigma theory 65 to international relations. Zarakol -who detailed how three former empires (Turkey, Japan and Russia) joined international society while maintaining an inferior status -did not apply her conceptual framework to Iran. However, she wrote that "[a]spects of my argument apply to states such as Iran…as well." 66 When Zarakol's argument is applied to Iran, its imperial legacy, the fact of being a "thorn between East and West" and its desire of belonging to -and to be acknowledged as part of -international society appear as the main drivers of the Iranian attempts for ending the nuclear deal. With its offers -in particular the very comprehensive 2003 bargain -Iran sought to be accepted by the international society as a peer member. International recognition of its great-power status, in turn, was needed in order to legitimately pursue a central role in regional politics. This interpretation of Iran's behaviour in offering the United States generous proposals of dispute settlement can fit Sakwa's definition of Russia's foreign behaviour as neorevisionist. 67 In fact, Iran too "wishes not to destroy the existing constitution of international society, but to modify it in a way that would give Russia [Iran] what is perceived to be its due weight and to ensure that hegemonic powers apply their normative declarations to themselves as well as to others." As proof, the discursive approaches of both President Rowhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to international relations underline the importance of multilateralism and the need for cooperation. 68 Sakwa claims that "Russia doesn't seek to challenge the existing world order. Hence, rather than being a revisionist power, Russia is neo-revisionist" (p. 214). The same holds true for Iran and therefore it can be defined as a neorevisionist power. 69 As long as the JCPOA will be integrally fulfilled by all the actors involved, Iran is going to play an increasingly active role not only in the Middle East and Central Asia, but in the greater Eurasian space. Some US foreign policy and intelligence analysts suggested -even during the nuclear deal -a different approach to Iran within a wider shift of the US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Central Asia. 70 The role Iran played during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan should indeed represent proof of its importance as a regional player. Whether or not the Obama Administration had Iran in mind as a strategic partner for its foreign policy strategy in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia regions when Secretary of State Kerry signed the JCPOA in July 2015, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated the importance of its potential role in stabilising those regions. 71 Stability and security in the Caucasus and Central Asia appear indeed to be Iranian foreign policy's main objectives. In fact, Islamic radical terrorism and out-of-control drug trafficking would undermine any perspective of economic recovery and growth for Iran. Some authors have demonstrated how, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeyini in 1989, Iranian foreign policy has increasingly been guided more by material factors than ideological ones. 72 Moreover, it has been characterised by what some analysts have defined as "prudent pragmatism." 73 The analysis of the Iranian offers for solving the nuclear deal has confirmed the interpretation of Iran as a status seeker whose pragmatic foreign policy is led by geopolitical determinants and is mainly aimed at preserving the existing international order.
In August 2013, shortly after his appointment as Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif wrote that:
[a]s a solid regional power in this era of intense transition in global politics, Iran stands in a unique position. Given its large landmass and unique geographic position along the east-west transit route, Iran, since antiquity, has enjoyed a preeminent position in its region and beyond.(…) Any objective analysis of Iran's unique attributes within the larger context of its tumultuous region would reveal the country's significant potential for a prominent regional and global role. The Islamic Republic can actively contribute to the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability and play a catalytic role during this current transitional stage in international relations. 74 Similarly, speaking to the Asia Society and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on 27 September 2013, President Rouhani said that:
Iran has actual and potential capabilities for enhancing its role in the world arena.(…) Iran's millennial culture and civilization, its exceptional Iranian state continuity rooted in millennial, its distinguished geopolitics, the characteristics that foster Iran's social stability in the midst of a region in turmoil as well as the pool of its well-educated youth, all in all, enable us to confidently look to the future and aspire to assume the major role in the global level that our people deserve; a role that no actor in global politics can ever ignore.
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After the conclusion of the nuclear deal, legitimately and fully returned into the fold of the international community, Iran is now ready to play a peculiar and pragmatic role in the greater Eurasian space whose importance will increasingly be evident.
